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I. INTRODUCTION
Employee and employer conflict is at the core of our eco-
nomic and social structure. Consequently, employment law may
be among the most political of legal areas. Legislation and court
decisions have historically reflected the shifting balance of eco-
t Adjunct Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Industrial Relations,
Saint Francis College; Counsel to Stevens & Lee, Reading, Pennsylvania; B.A.,
Thiel College; M.P.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Vanderbilt Uni-
versity; LL.M. (Labor), Temple University; Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
(101)
1
Decker: At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania after Banas and Darlington: Ne
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
nomic forces between employee and employer.1 Today, these
forces are shaping the substantive area of at-will employment.2
The at-will employment relationship allows termination of
employment by either an employee or employer at any time for
no reason.3 Wide-spread criticism has arisen over this employ-
ment concept. 4 Today, courts and legislatures are creating ex-
1. For a discussion of the history of the labor movement within the United
States, see generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1-66 (2d ed.
1983).
2. For an overview of the development of the employment at-will doctrine,
see Feinman, The Development of the Employment At-Will Rule, 20 AM.J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 118-35 (1976); Pierce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termination at Will: A Prin-
cipled Approach, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1982) [hereinafter Pierce]; Annotation,
Right to Discharge Allegedly "At- Will" Employee as Affected by Employer's Promulgation of
Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33 A.L.R. 4th 120, 123-24 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d
174, 176 (1974) ("Absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary,
the law has taken for granted the power of either party to terminate an employ-
ment relationship for any or no reason."); Darlington v. General Electric, 350
Pa. Super. 183, 189, 504 A.2d 306, 309 (1986) ("[A]n employment contract of
indefinite duration was deemed to be terminable at will for any cause or no
cause, regardless of the 'morality' of the situation."); Banas v. Matthews Int'l
Corp., 348 Pa. Super. 464, 479, 502 A.2d 637, 644 (1985) (quoting Geary, 456
Pa. at 175, 319 A.2d at 176); see also Note, The Employment Handbook as a Contrac-
tual Limitation on the Employment at Will Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REV. 335, 335 (1986)
("The employment at will doctrine.., holds that under a general agreement of
employment for an indefinite length of time, the hiring of an employee is at will
and the employer is free to terminate an employee at any time for any reason.")
(citing Payne v. Western & Atd. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on other
grounds sub nom., Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138
(1915)).
The Second Restatement of Agency refers to at-will employment as follows:
"Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ
and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable
upon notice by either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may
terminate by lapse of time or by supervening events." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 442 (1958).
4. For a discussion of criticisms and judicial erosion of the at-will employ-
ment doctrine, see C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAw OF EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS: FORMATION, OPERATION AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH 115 (1983)
("Perhaps no other issue in the law of employment contracts has generated as
much recent controversy and commentary as the judicial erosion of the employ-
ment at-will rule."); J. KAUFF & M. MCCLAIN, UNJUST DISMISSAL UP-DATE
1985-How TO EVALUATE, LITIGATE, SETrLE, AND AVOID CLAIMS (1985); Blades,
Employment At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416 (1967) ("[T]he philosophy [of at-will em-
ployment] is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate em-
ployers; it does not comport with the need to preserve individual freedom in
today's job-oriented, industrial society."); Decker, At-Will Employment in Penn-
sylvania-A Proposal for its Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 477,
482 (1983) [hereinafter Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania] ("Perhaps the
most significant recent development affecting employment relations has been
the modification of at-will employment in a number of jurisdictions."); Decker,
At- Will Employment: A Proposalfor its Statutory Regulation, 1 HOFSTRA LAB. L.F. 187,
[Vol. 32: p. 101
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ceptions to this laissez faire employment relationship, particularly
in cases wherein employees are terminated in a manner inconsis-
tent with public policy.5 Pennsylvania courts have not remained
189 (1983) [hereinafter Decker, Proposal] ("the need to protect the at-will em-
ployee, who does not possess the bargaining power equal to that of an em-
ployer, has arrived"); Decker, At-Will Employment Abolition and Federal Statutory
Regulation, 61 U. DET. J. URB. L. 351, 360 (1984) [hereinafter Decker, Federal
Regulation] ("Today, there is a growing recognition that the at-will employee
should be protected similar to the way most public employees and union-organ-
ized employees... are protected."); Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies as
Express or Implied Guarantees of Employment-Employer Beware, 5 J.L. & CoM. 207
(1984) (suggesting "fairness" rationale for employers wishing to terminate at-
will employees); Flaxman, Employment Manuals in Pennsylvania-Contract or Unen-
forceable Gratuity, 21 PHILA. LAw., Oct. 1984, at 1; Peck, Unjust Discharges From
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1979) ("[T]he
overwhelming importance of the employment relation to the individual em-
ployee, coupled with the arbitrariness and capriciousness of a rule that permits
the termination of that relation without cause, necessitates that the courts...
reexamine the suitability of that rule."); St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HUMAN
RTS. 32, 53 (1982) ("Not a single respected and disinterested voice has been
heard to suggest there is any valid, substantial reason for opposing the require-
ment ofjust cause."); Summers, Protecting All Employees Against Unjust Dismissal, 58
HARV. Bus. REV. 132, 134 (1980) ("The critical fact is that [the courts] have
perpetuated legal rules that run counter to accepted principles of personnel
practices and social values .... all sense of fairness, and all principles of due
process."); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Stat-
ute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484 (1976) ("[T]he anachronistic legal rule that employ-
ees can be discharged for any reason or no reason should be abandoned.");
Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment At-Will
Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 247 (1984) ("The trend toward
liberalization of the strict doctrine of employment at will ... is unmistakable.").
Additionally, law firms have begun warning their clients about exceptions to
the at-will employment relationship. See 112 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) News and
Background Information 148 (Feb. 21, 1983); cf. Decker, Federal Regulation, supra at
372-74 (suggesting employer policies which minimize exposure to at-will em-
ployment litigation); Swerdlow, Wrongful Discharge: A California Management Labor
Lawyer's Perspective and Preventive Recommendations, 2 PREVENTIVE L. REP. 26, 28-31
(1983) (same).
5. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (employee refused to engage in price-fixing); Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471,427 A.2d 385 (1980) (employee refused
to engage in illegal act); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978) (employee terminated after filing worker's compensation claim);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (same);
Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't. of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App.
2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981) (same); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666
S.W.2d 730 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (same); Siles v. Travenol Laboratories, 13 Mass.
App. Ct. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103 (1982) (termination to avoid payment of em-
ployee's commission); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d
151 (1976) (termination following filing of worker's compensation claim); Hen-
derson v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (same);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (employee
terminated for refusing employer's social advances); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85
N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (worker's compensation claim); McCullough v.
Certain Teed Products Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979) (refusal to participate in fellow employees' illegal acts); Nees v. Hocks,
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untouched in their consideration of the at-will employment
relationship. 6
272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (termination for not avoiding jury duty);
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978)
(same); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (organization of
labor union); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978)
(employee terminated following attempt to require employer's compliance with
state and federal consumer credit laws).
For a discussion of public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doc-
trine, see Baxter & Wohl, Wrongful Termination Lawsuits: The Employers Finally Win
a Few, 10 EMPLOYEE RELATIONs L.J. 258, 260-63 (1984); Pierce, supra note 2, at
27-36; Note, Discharge of Employee At-Will Actionable Under Public Policy Exception-
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 557, 569-71
(1981). For a survey of state public policy exceptions to the at-will employment
doctrine, see Employment-at-Will: A State-by-State Survey, 1984 REP. OF THE A.B.A.
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL SUBCOMMITTEE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONs LAW
COMMITrEE, LITIGATION SECTION 1-252.
Courts have created other exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine,
finding, for example, express or implied contractual guarantees of employment
or implied-in-law covenants of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's
Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (factors such as dura-
tion of employment and employer assurances gave rise to implied contract);
Cleary v. American Airlines, I 11 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)
(length of service and employer's expressed policy concerning employee dis-
putes indicated implied covenant of good faith and therefore precluded em-
ployee dismissal without just cause); see also H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE
DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.14, at 23-24 (1984) (predicting future judicial
preference for implied-in-fact contract theory rather than implied-in-law cove-
nant). For a discussion of enforcement of employment handbook provisions
under a contract analysis, see Comment, Employment-at-Will in Pennsylvania: Em-
ployee Manuals Provide Contract Remedies for Discharged Employees, 58 TEMP. L.Q.
243, 259-66 (1985); Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will Contracts,
1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 212-19.
6. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174
(1974). In Geary, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the "novel" issue
of whether an at-will employee could assert a cause of action for "wrongful dis-
charge." Id. at 174, 319 A.2d at 175. The court recited that the general rule in
Pennsylvania was that "[a]bsent a statutory or contractual provision to the con-
trary, the law has taken for granted the power of either party to terminate an
employment relationship for any or no reason." Id. at 175, 319 A.2d at 176
(citations omitted). The court went on to state in dicta, however, that
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in which his
employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these ar-
eas by virtue of the employee's power of discharge might give rise to a
cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet of public pol-
icy is threatened.
Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180 (dicta) (emphasis added).
The Geary court nevertheless decided the case before it on the basis that the
plaintiff-employee (Geary) had "made a nuisance of himself" by protesting the
sale of allegedly unsafe steel tubing products to various levels of management.
Id. at 180, 319 A.2d at 178. Thus, the court concluded that Geary was termi-
nated for a legitimate reason, that "no clear mandate of public policy [was] vio-
lated thereby;" and thus, as an at-will employee, Geary had no cause of action
for "wrongful discharge." Id. at 185, 319 A.2d at 180.
In the twelve years following Geary, however, the Pennsylvania courts have
seized on Geary's dicta to create a common-law public policy exception to the
[Vol. 32: p. 101
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Recently, in Banas v. Matthews International (Banas 1/),7 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court considered whether handbooks and
employment policies are binding employer commitments in
Pennsylvania. The superior court spent nearly three years in its
attempt to conclusively resolve this issue for Pennsylvania em-
ployees and employers, including en banc reargument following
general rule of termination at-will. See, e.g., Banas v. Matthews Int'l, 348 Pa.
Super. 464, 481-83, 502 A.2d 637, 646 (1985). In Banas, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania stated that, in the absence of contractual modification, the employ-
ment at-will rule is presumed to apply. Id. at 479, 502 A.2d at 644. Thus, the
plaintiff-employee has the burden of proving that the public policy exception is
applicable. Id. at 483, 502 A.2d at 646. In Banas, however, the employee neither
pleaded nor proved facts to overcome the at-will presumption, and thus the
court upheld his termination. Id. at 483, 502 A.2d at 647.
For Pennsylvania cases dealing with the at-will employment principle and
the application of a public policy exception, see, for example, Cisco v. United
Parcel Servs., 328 Pa. Super. 300, 476 A.2d 1340 (1984) (termination based on
prior criminal charges against employee not public policy violation where em-
ployer has legitimate interest); Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320
Pa. Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983) (recognizing Geary public exception
though not raised in pleadings); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super.
560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980) (termination of employee who reported manager's lie
served employer's interest and did not violate public policy); Hunter v. Port
Auth., 277 Pa. Super. 4, 419 A.2d 631 (1980) (recognizing denial of public em-
ployment to applicant who had been pardoned for previous assault conviction as
violation of strong public policy of rehabilitation); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams,
Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (discharge of employee for service
ofjury duty violates public policy). See also Casebrief, Grundon v. Defense Activ-
ities Fed. Credit Union, 33 CUMB. COUNTY L.J. 529 (1983) (dismissal for em-
ployee's conduct in disregard of employer's chain of command held not
violation of public policy); Casebrief, Cuccaro v. United States Steel Corp., 131
PIrr. LJ. 534 (1982) (termination prior to employee's hearing on charges of
marijuana possession does not violate public policy); Casebrief, Butler v. Negley
House, Inc., 129 Prr. LJ. 350 (1981) (refusal to rehire employee who filed
claim under Worker's Compensation Act violates public policy and thwarts legis-
lative intent).
Federal courts in Pennsylvania have also resolved numerous wrongful ter-
mination cases. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.
1983) (public policy and implied contract); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (termination on basis of polygraph test); Karr
v. Township of Lower Merion, 582 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (public policy);
Rettinger v. American Can Co., 574 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (termination
due to filing of worker's compensation claim); Molush v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (termination on basis of polygraph test);
Forman v. BRI Corp., 532 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (alleged hiring for rea-
sonable time); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (ter-
mination for refusing to participate in price fixing); Wagner v. Sperry Univac,
458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (termination contrary to employment manual),
aff'd mem., 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F.
Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (rationale unrelated to that espoused in Geary). For a
discussion of Pennsylvania state and federal court decisions after Geary, see
Comment, supra note 4, at 250-56.
7. (Banas I1), 348 Pa. Super. 464, 502 A.2d 637 (1985). For a discussion of
the Banas II decision, see infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
1987]
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the original superior court panel's decision, Banas v. Mathews In-
ternational (Banas I)." The superior court's subsequent decision,
however, has not provided final direction. Pennsylvania employ-
ees and employers may be in no better position since the superior
court's recent decision in Banas II than they were when the origi-
nal conflict arose between the Banas I panel and the panel in Rich-
ardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hospital.9
Within a month after the Banas II decision, the superior
court, in Darlington v. General Electric,'0 suggested that further
modification of the at-will employment doctrine by the judiciary
be curtailed in the absence of legislative action." Against this
background and within the framework of an ultimate legislative
solution, this Article will discuss the superior court's decisions in
Banas II and Darlington.
II. BANAS V. MATTHEWS: HANDBOOKS AND EMPLOYMENT
POLICIES IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. The Role of Employment Handbooks and Policies Generally
Employers use handbooks and employment policies to com-
municate with their employees on a variety of subjects, including
work rules, discipline policies, wages and fringe benefits.' 2 Spe-
cifically, these communication devices often outline: 1) rules of
expected employee behavior; 2) disciplinary or termination pro-
8. (Banas I), 116 LRRM (BNA) 3110 (Pa. Super. 1984), later proceeding, 348
Pa. Super. 464, 502 A.2d 637 (1985). The original superior court decision in
Banas I, issued on June 15, 1984, held that an employee manual provision could
create an enforceable contract right in an at-will employee. The Banas I decision
conflicted with a superior court decision from the previous year, which held a
similar manual provision unenforceable. See Richardson v. Charles Cole Memo-
rial Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 106, 108, 466 A.2d 1084, 1085 (1983).
The superior court granted en banc reargument in the Banas case; reargu-
ment occurred in December, 1984. See Banas 11, 348 Pa. Super. at 464, 502 A.2d
at 637. The Banas II opinion, however, was not filed until December, 1985. See
id. For a discussion of the Banas I decision, see infra notes 27-32 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the Banas H decision, see infra notes 33-40 and
accompanying text.
9. 320 Pa. Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983) (employee manual provision
held unenforceable). For a discussion of Richardson, see infra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
10. 350 Pa. Super. 183, 504 A.2d 306 (1986). For a discussion of Darling-
ton, see infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
11. 350 Pa. Super. at 191-92, 504 A.2d at 310 ("[W]e believe that if termi-
nable-at-will contracts are to be forbidden, the judicial process may be an inap-
propriate forum for such sweeping policy change.").
12. See H. PERRIT-r, supra note 5, § 8.5, at 309. Professor Perritt categorizes
typical provisions as "those circumscribing employee authority or activities and
those governing the granting of benefits to employees." Id.
106 [Vol. 32: p. 101
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cedures; 3) hours and wages; 4) layoff and recall policy and
5) benefits such as health care insurance, pensions, leaves of ab-
sence, holidays and vacations. Frequently, the handbook is the
sole place in which the employer sets forth these statements.
They are commonly intended to create a closer relationship be-
tween an employer and its employees by establishing and main-
taining a communication network.' 3 For this reason, no two
employer's handbooks and employment policies are exactly alike.
The variety in practice reflects the employer's particular opera-
tional and management styles.
Handbooks and employment policies gained importance as
employers became larger, requiring a system of rules for orderly
and efficient employer functioning. 14 Small employers can usu-
ally operate with few or no formal rules, because activities can be
individually directed. 15 For larger employers, however, individu-
alized decision making becomes impractical. Increased size mul-
tiplies the number of employment decisions to be made beyond
the ability of one person to make them.' 6
B. The Development of Pennsylvania Courts' Treatment of Employment
Handbooks and Policies
Handbooks and employment policies have become increas-
ingly involved in challenges to the at-will employment relation-
ship.' 7 Courts have, under certain circumstances, considered
13. See C. BAKALY &J. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 169. Grievance proce-
dure mechanisms serve to reduce the incidence of costly and embarassing litiga-
tion as well as to improve employee morale. Id. Such internal dispute
resolution systems have been developed by employers in response to the ero-
sion of the at-will employment doctrine. See id. Thus, many employers currently
provide, to at-will employees, dispute resolution systems which range from very
informal to as highly-structured as ones typically found in collective bargaining
agreements. Id. As applied to at-will employees, these systems are often re-
ferred to as "open door" policy, "formal appeal" to management and "arbitra-
tion." See id
14. See H. PERRITr, supra note 5, § 8.2, at 304. For a discussion of the his-
torical development of employee personnel policies, see id. § 8.2, at 304-06.
15. Id. § 8.3, at 306.
16. Id. § 8.3, at 306-07 ("When organizations get larger .... the feasibility
of discretionary decision making diminishes if the organization's activities are to
be coordinated.").
17. See C. BAKALY &J. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 41. The issue which gave
rise to the recent controversy is whether the manuals bind employers. Bakaly
and Grossman state:
For many years, the law was clear that a manual was merely a unilateral
statement of position by the employer. Its provisions were guidelines
only, and could be followed or not at the employer's discretion. In re-
1987]
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these employer communications as binding commitments.' 8
cent years, however, numerous cases have been litigated over whether
an employer is bound by the terms of a manual issued to employees.
Id.
18. Handbooks and employment policies have been found, under certain
circumstances, to be binding commitments in the following states: Leikvold v.
Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) (Arizona)
(en banc); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980) (Arkan-
sas); Hugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)
(California); Salimi v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)
(Colorado); Finley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64,
certification granted, 198 Conn. 802, 501 A.2d 1213 (1985) (Connecticut); District
of Columbia Washington Welfare Ass'n v. Poindexter, 479 A.2d 313 (D.C. 1984)
(District of Columbia); Falls v. Lawnwood Medical Center, 427 So. 2d 361 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Florida); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho
330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (Idaho); Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency,
24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (1974) (Illinois); Fletcher v. Wesley Medi-
cal Center, 585 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Kan. 1984) (Kansas); Shah v. American Syn-
thetic Rubber Corp., 655 So. 2d 489 (Ky. 1983) (Kentucky); Staggs v. Blue
Cross, 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798, cert. denied, 303 Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349
(1985) (Maryland); Garrity v. Valley View Nursing Home, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 822,
406 N.E.2d 423 (1980) (Massachusetts); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (Michigan); Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (Minnesota); Morris v. Lutheran Medical
Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983) (Nebraska); Southwest Gas Corp.
v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983) (Nevada); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 NJ. 10, 499 A.2d 515
(1985) (New Jersey); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d
441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (New York); Hedrick v. Center for Comprehen-
sive Alcoholism Treatment, 7 Ohio App. 3d 211, 454 N.E.2d 1343 (1982)
(Ohio); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976)
(Oklahoma); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d
356 (1978) (Oregon); Banas H, 348 Pa. Super. 464, 502 A.2d 637 (1985) (Penn-
sylvania); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (Penn-
sylvania); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983) (South
Dakota); Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (Ten-
nessee); Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1985)
(Virginia); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081
(1984) (Washington) (en banc).
But see Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (employer's yearly salary increase policy not contractual obligation)
(Florida); Service Employees Int'l Union v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare,
106 Idaho 756, 683 P.2d 404 (1984) (government agency handbook is merely
guideline and has no legal effect) (Idaho);Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co.,
220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1979) ("just cause" proviso in employment manual
creates no express or implied contractual obligation) (Kansas); Richardson, 320
Pa. Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983) (employer's failure to adhere to policy did
not give rise to breach of contract action) (Pennsylvania).
Damage award against employers in these cases can be substantial. See, e.g.,
Washington Welfare Ass'n v. Poindexter, 479 A.2d 313 (D.C. 1984).
Handbooks and employment policies have been found to be nonbinding
commitments in the following states: White v. Chelsea Indus., 425 So. 2d 1090
(Ala. 1983) (Alabama); Heideck v. Kent General Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1982) (Delaware); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328
N.E.2d 775 (1975) (Indiana); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637 (La.
Ct. App. 1982) (Louisiana); Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d
135 (Me. 1977) (Maine); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss1/3
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
Pennsylvania courts, until recently, rejected any binding commit-
ments arising from handbooks and employment policies. 19 The
first indication that Pennsylvania courts might consider hand-
books and employment policies as binding commitments ap-
peared in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.2 0  Disregarding
precedent which attached no binding effect to handbooks and em-
ployment policies, the court held that a jury could find that an
employer's policies and procedures are binding.21 In Novosel, the
Third Circuit noted that its role required it to predict the way in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide this issue.22
The federal court's decision in Novosel, however, was not fol-
lowed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court's panel in Richardson.2 3
In Richardson, a director of nursing contended that a handbook
P.2d 1063 (1982) (Montana); Roberts v. Wake Forest Univ., 55 N.C. App. 430,
286 S.E.2d 120 (1982) (North Carolina); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644
S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (Texas).
19. See, e.g., Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (E.D.
Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979) ("There is nothing in the law
of Pennsylvania suggesting that failure to adhere to certain stated guidelines
constitutes ... [a] violation of public policy .... Therefore, we conclude that
failure to adhere to company personnel policy does not create a cause of action
for breach of an employment contract.").
Beidler brought a wrongful termination suit against his former employer,
based in part on the employer's failure to comply with the termination proce-
dures set out in the personnel policy. 461 F. Supp. at 1015. The district court,
relying on out-of-state precedent, rejected Beidler's contention that his em-
ployer's failure to adhere to the policy constituted a breach of implied contract.
Id. at 1016. For recent commentary discussing Biedler's effect on the develop-
ment of Pennsylvania's common-law jurisprudence with regard to enforceability
of terms in employment manuals, see Flaxman, supra, note 4.
20. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). In his wrongful termination suit, Novosel
alleged that his dismissal resulted from his refusal to lobby for his employer, and
from his opposition to his employer's political viewpoint. Id. at 896. The Third
Circuit held that Novosel stated a wrongful discharge claim under the public
policy exception to at-will employment. Id. at 900 (citing Geary v. United States
Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 184-85, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974)). However, the
court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether Novosel stated a
cause of action for wrongful discharge or breach of contract based on Nation-
wide's practice or policy. Id. at 902-03. On remand, the district court denied
Nationwide's motion for summary judgment regarding Novosel's wrongful dis-
charge and breach of contract claims. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 118
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2779 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
21. Novosel, 721 F.2d at 902-03. The Third Circuit vacated the district
court's order that granted Nationwide's motion to dismiss both the tort and con-
tract claims. Id. at 895-96. The court stated that "Novosel's allegation that Na-
tionwide's custom, practice or policy created either a contractual just cause
requirement or contractual procedures by which defendant failed to abide is a
factual matter that should survive a motion to dismiss." Id. at 902-03.
22. See id. at 897.
23. 320 Pa. Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983). The Richardson panel con-
sisted of Judges Cavanaugh, Cirillo and Rowley.
1987]
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issued by the hospital constituted part of her employment con-
tract, and that it provided for a definite tenure of employment. 24
In rejecting Richardson's position, the superior court panel
stated:
In Beid[l]er v. W.R. Grace, Inc.,... the federal district
court held that under Pennsylvania law, failure to adhere
to a company personnel policy does not create a cause of
action for breach of an employment contract. We agree
with that holding.
Appellant's unilateral act of publishing its policies
did not amount to the 'meeting of the minds' required
for a contract. The terms of the handbook were not bar-
gained for by the parties and any benefits conferred by it
were mere gratuities .... In fact, the handbook was uni-
laterally revised by appellant twice during appellee's
employment.
The record in this case clearly indicates that appel-
lee's employment was terminable at will by either party.
Therefore, appellant is not liable for breach of contract
as a result of appellee's discharge. 25
After Richardson, it appeared certain that employees could
not successfully assert that handbooks and employment policies
were binding commitments in Pennsylvania.2 6 However, approxi-
mately nine months after Richardson, another superior court
panel, in Banas I, decided that an employee handbook was a bind-
ing commitment for some purposes, but not for others. 27
Banas was an at-will employee who was terminated for using
his employer's materials to make a grave marker for his nephew's
grave.28 He claimed that this work did not violate the employee
handbook, which authorized the use of employer equipment and
24. Id. at 108, 466 A.2d at 1085. Richardson based her claim on a provision
in the handbook which stated "that it was the policy of the hospital 'to provide
continual employment to all employees whose work proves satisfactory.'" Id.
25. Id. at 108-09, 466 A.2d at 1085 (citations omitted).
26. See id. at 108, 466 A.2d at 1085 ("We hold that... that [the lower] court
erred in concluding that the policies set forth in the employee handbook consti-
tuted part of appellee's contract of employment.").
27. See Banas I, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3110, 3114 (Pa. Super. 1984) ("We ...
hold that a manual published or authorized by an employer and distributed to
an employee-at-will becomes part of the parties' employment contract except as
to the term (length) of employment."). The Banas I panel consisted of Judges
Brosky, McEwen and Beck.
28. Id. at 3111. Banas' employer was a manufacturer of bronze signs, plates
and grave markers. Id.
[Vol. 32: p. 101
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waste material, with permission, for personal work.29
The Banas I panel did not overrule Richardson, but indicated
instead that the cases upon which it relied were of "doubtful"
precedential value.30 In Banas I, the superior court distinguished
Richardson, stating that:
While it is clear, and Richardson holds, that a manual can-
not create a contract giving an at-will employee a definite
term (length) of employment, it is equally clear that the
content of a manual is not meaningless. We are unwill-
ing to conclude that 'an employee handbook on person-
nel policies and procedures is a corporate illusion, full of
sound ... signifying nothing.' 3 1
The panel concluded that the handbook was part of the em-
ployer's unilateral employment offer, for which the employee sup-
plies both acceptance and consideration by performing the job.3 2
However, the Banas I panel recognized the employer's continuing
right to "augment, modify, and even withdraw" the handbook,
stating that a new offer of employment becomes effective on the
date the new handbook is distributed.3 3 This panel's decision,
however, was reargued before the superior court sitting en
banc,34 presumably to resolve the conflict between Banas I and
Richardson.
On December 20, 1985, the Pennsylvania Superior Court is-
sued its Banas H decision, reversing that part of Banas I which had
awarded Banas damage for breach of contract.3 5 Purporting to
29. Id. at 3112. The court characterized the issue before it as whether "the
manual create[d] an enforceable contract right in Banas that he could make a
grave marker, with permission, and not be fired." Id. at 3114. The employer
argued that the supervisor did not know Banas' intended use when he granted
permission. Id. at 3111.
30. Id. at 3113 n.4. The court noted two Third Circuit decisions which held
that an employment policy could contractually bind an employer, and thus im-
pliedly overruled Pennsylvania case law stating otherwise. Id. (citing Wolk v.
Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984); Novosel, 721 F.2d 894 (3d
Cir. 1983)).
31. 116 L.R.R.M. at 3113 (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 3114. Under this contractual analysis, the Banas I court held that
"[e]mployers bind themselves by the manual to that class of employees rightfully
entitled to receive the manual." Id.
33. Id. The court noted that the new offer is limited to the provisions of the
new manual, and where the employer withdraws the manual, a new offer begins
upon notification of withdrawal to the employee. Id. By continuing employ-
ment, the employee accepts the new offer and provides consideration to support
the contract. Id.
34. See Banas M, 348 Pa. Super. at 464, 466, 502 A.2d at 637, 638.
35. Id. at 467, 502 A.2d at 638. The court affirmed the judgment awarding
1987]
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conclusively resolve the conflict created by Richardson 3 6 and Banas
J,37 the Banas II majority held that the handbook provision relied
upon by Banas did not bind his employer to terminate only for
"good cause" because "the handbook did not contain, expressly
or by clear implication, any just cause provision [and the em-
ployee Banas] has shown nothing to take his case out of the set-
tled employee-at-will rule." 38 The court concluded that the issue
of whether a handbook provision can bind an employer "is a deci-
sion that must await a case in which the action is brought for
breach of a just cause provision." 39 However, three members of
the nine-judge panel dissented, in part,40 arguing that handbook
provisions are binding as part of an employer's unilateral offer of
employment. 4 1
Banas damages on a defamation claim, which he based on remarks of the em-
ployer's officers. Id.
36. For a discussion of Richardson, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying
text.
37. For a discussion of Banas I and its effects on the holding in Richardson,
see supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
38. Banas 11, 348 Pa. Super. at 485, 502 A.2d at 648. The court stated that
the question of whether Banas' supervisor gave him permission to use the com-
pany's materials was irrelevant, because the "handbook nowhere provided that
an employee would be dismissed only if thefacts warranted it." Id. at 484, 502 A.2d
at 647 (emphasis added). The court stated, however, that "[ifthe handbook had
contained, if not expressly at least by clear implication, a just cause provision,
then [a] . .. claim might have [had] merit." Id. at 484-85, 502 A.2d at 647.
39. Id. at 485, 502 A.2d at 648. The superior court noted other courts
which have created an exception to the employment-at-will rule, where an em-
ployment handbook contains a provision committing the employer to dismiss an
employee for just cause only. Id. at 483, 502 A.2d at 647 (citing Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 568, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982)). However, the
Banas I court expressly refused to decide whether it agreed with these decisions,
stating that "it would be mere dictum, for nowhere in the employee handbook
issued by appellant is there a provision that commits appellant to dismiss an
employee for just cause only." Id. at 484, 502 A.2d at 697. The court projected
that "[i]n another case we may, or may not, decide to permit recovery for breach
of a commitment made by the employer in an employee handbook, but this case
does not present that issue." Id.
40. Id. at 486-87, 502 A.2d at 648-49 (Rowley, Beck and Johnson, JJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
41. Id. at 504, 502 A.2d 658 (Beck, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Rowley and Johnson, JJ.) Judge Beck stated:
[T]he provisions of a handbook distributed to employees can constitute
an offer of a unilateral contract which an employee may accept by re-
maining on the job, and that once accepted, the provisions of the hand-
book are binding on both parties as conditions of employment until
modified by a subsequent offer and acceptance of new conditions.
Id. (Beck, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Rowley and
Johnson, JJ.)
While the Banas II decision was pending after en banc reargument, courts in
112
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III. AFTER BANAS II: IMPLICATIONS OF A JUST CAUSE
REQUIREMENT
Prior to the Banas cases, the 1974 Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision in Geary v. United States Steel Corp. 42 held that there
was no common-law cause of action for "unjust" or "wrongful"
termination in Pennsylvania. 43 The court acknowledged, how-
ever, that a public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine may exist, stating: "[T]he employer's power of dis-
charge might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly
where some recognized facet of public policy is threatened. '44
The Pennsylvania cases following Geary relied on this language to
develop "as a matter of common law a public policy exception to
the [at-will] rule."45 The Pennsylvania Superior Court recog-
nized the existence of this exception in Banas II and suggested, in
dicta, that this exception may be available to an employee who
was asserting that his or her employer was bound by a handbook
or employment policy which expressly or by clear implication
guaranteed just-cause dismissal.46 The plaintiff-employee in
Banas, however "neither pleaded nor proved that his case [fell]
within . . . [this] public policy exception."' 47 Thus, the Banas H
court refrained from deciding whether the Geary public policy ex-
four states geographically close to Pennsylvania adopted the reasoning of the
Banas H dissenting opinions and that of the Banos I majority, holding that hand-
book and employment policies are binding on employers. See Finley v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Co., 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (hand-
book provision satisfying standard of unilateral offer binds employer upon em-
ployee's acceptance through employment); Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., 61 Md.
App. 381, 486 A.2d 798, cert. denied, 303 Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985) (sum-
mary judgment precluded because some but not all handbook provisions are
contractually binding); Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491
A.2d 1257, modified, 101 NJ. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) (implied promise in hand-
book to terminate only for cause is enforceable against employer in absence of
disclaimer); Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va.
1985) (just cause provision binds employer under unilateral contract theory).
42. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
43. Id. at 185, 319 A.2d at 180.
44. Id. (dicta).
45. Banas 11, 348 Pa. Super. at 481, 502 A.2d at 646.
46. Id. at 482-85, 502 A.2d at 646-47 ("If the handbook had contained, if
not expressly at least by clear implication, a just cause provision, then appellee's
claim might have merit.") (dicta).
47. Id. at 482, 502 A.2d at 646. In her separate concurring and dissenting
opinion, Judge Beck criticized the majority for discussing just cause in dicta:
I do not understand the majority's injection ofjust cause dismissal lan-
guage. The majority introduces the just cause issue sua sponte. I can
only conclude that the majority's just cause discussion is purely advi-
sory. The parties never raised the issue of a just cause dismissal and
the majority has found that the employee handbook is not before the
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ception applied in implied-in-fact contract cases such as Banas.4s
In light of Banas H, Pennsylvania employees and employers
presently have no clear standard against which to determine when
and if handbooks and employment policies are binding commit-
ments by the employers. The Banas H majority suggested that
this issue must continue to be litigated on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether handbook provisions or employment policies
express a sufficiently clear "just-cause" guarantee to merit appli-
cation of the public policy exception to the at-will rule.49
The Banas H majority, however, offered little, if any, guidance
as to what constitutes an "express just cause" or "just cause by
clear implication" commitment by an employer.50 For example, it
is unclear whether "express just cause" or "just cause by clear
implication" exists where, for example, the employer promul-
gates: 1) disciplinary rules outlining expected conduct; 2) inter-
nal grievance procedures or 3) words stating discipline or
termination will only be for good reason, good cause, reasonable
cause or in the best interest of the employer. Similarly, it is un-
clear whether an employer's conduct in disciplining and terminat-
ing employees creates a binding commitment where no express
just-cause provision exists. Is this just cause by clear
implication?5 1
court and therefore refuses to determine if the handbook in any way
modified Banas' at-will status.
Id. at 499, 502 A.2d at 655 (Beck, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 481-83, 502 A.2d at 646-47.
49. Id. at 484-85, 502 A.2d at 647-48.
50. See id. at 481-86, 502 A.2d at 646-47.
51. For evidence that confusion exists in post-Banas H cases in which courts
continue to grapple with accomodation of the at-will rule and just cause termina-
tion policy, see Martin v. Capital Cities Media, 354 Pa. Super. 199, 511 A.2d 830
(1986). In Martin, the court reasoned that the binding effect of an employment
handbook arises from "evidence of the employer's intention to be legally bound
and to convert an at-will employee into an employee who cannot be fired with-
out objective just cause." Id. at 221-22, 511 A.2d at 841. The handbook in
Martin specifically stated that the list of actions which would lead to disciplinary
action was illustrative and "shall not be deemed to exclude any otherjust causes."
Id. at 219, 511 A.2d at 840 (emphasis in original). The Martin court then applied
a just cause analysis similar to that espoused in Banas H, stating:
[I]t seems clear that the employer did not intend to turn over to a trier
of fact in a judicial setting the responsibility of defining "just cause."
The intention to do so must be stated with clarity. The use of this term
must be read to mean that the employer, in his subjective judgment,
would decide what causes for discharge are "just." To regard the use of
the term "just cause" here as some sort of talisman which magically
converts the at-will employee into one who can never be discharged
without objective just cause would defy reason.
Id. at 219-20, 511 A.2d at 840 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 32: p. 101
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A. Analogies in Collective Bargaining Practices and Procedure
Practice and procedure under collective bargaining agree-
ments may offer guidance to the questions raised by Banas I.
The collective bargaining agreement is similar to a handbook or
employment policy, in that it includes provisions governing work
rules, discipline policies, wages and fringe benefits. 52 Under a
collective bargaining agreement, an employee's right to employ-
ment is a contractual right based on the collective bargaining
agreement, which is paramount to the individual contract of
employment.53
Most collective bargaining agreements in the private and
public sectors require a cause or just-cause standard for termina-
tion or other discipline.5 4 Arbitrator Joseph D. McGoldrick has
described the significance of the terms "cause" and "just cause"
as follows:
[I]t is common to include the right to suspend and dis-
charge for "just cause," "justifiable cause," "proper
cause," "obvious charge," or quite commonly simply for
''cause." There is no significant difference between
these various phrases. These exclude discharge for mere
whim or caprice. They are, obviously, intended to in-
clude those things for which employees have tradition-
ally been fired. They include the traditional causes of
discharge in the particular trade or industry, the prac-
tices which develop in the day-to-day relations of man-
agement and labor and most recently they include the
decisions of courts and arbitrators. They represent a
growing body of "common law" that may be regarded
either as the latest development of the law of "master
and servant" or, perhaps, more properly as part of a new
body of common law of "management and labor under
Following Martin, it is clear that uncertainty still exists as to the binding
effect of employment handbooks; as to what constitutes sufficient evidence of an
employer's intent to be bound thereby; and what effect "just cause" provisions
or policies have in these determinations.
52. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 540 (1976) ("The labor
agreement is not a contract of employment; employees are hired separately and
individually, but the tenure and terms of their employment once in the unit are
regulated by the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.").
53. J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) ("Individual contracts,
no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what their terms,
may not be availed of to defeat or delay .. .collective bargaining ... nor may
they be used ... to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement.").
54. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 652 (1985).
1987]
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collective bargaining agreements." They constitute the
duties owed by employees to management and, in their
correlative aspect, are part of the rights of management.
They include such duties as honesty, punctuality, sobri-
ety, or, coversely, the right to discharge for theft, re-
peated absence or lateness, destruction of company
property, brawling and the like. Where they are not ex-
pressed in posted rules, they may very well be implied,
provided they are applied in a uniform, non-discrimina-
tory manner. 55
Absent precise definitions, cause or just cause 56 may be consid-
ered any combination of the following: 1) the "law of the shop"
as to the particular offense; i.e., showing a consistent pattern of
response to that offense in a certain manner, as requiring severe
or less than severe discipline; 57 2) a consistent pattern of en-
forcement of rules and regulations and of making known the rules
to all employees; 58 3) case histories of other incidents of en-
forcement;59 4) known practices of severe discipline for certain
offenses because of the product manufactured or safety consider-
ation;60 5) offenses calling for immediate suspension and those
not requiring removal;6' 6) on-premises and off-premises of-
fenses, and the differences in their treatment;62 7) general "ar-
bitral authority," derived from publication of awards, articles,
etc.;63 8) the arbitrator's own sense of equity and his/her subjec-
tive judgment as to the significance, seriousness and weight to be
given the incident involved, the record of the employee, or the
circumstances causing the termination;64 9) the severity of the
55. Worthington Corp., 24 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 1, 6-7 (1955) (McGoldrick,
Arb.).
56. For a general discussion of cause and just cause, see F. ELKOURI & E.A.
ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 650-54.
57. SeeJ. REDEKER, DISCIPLINE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 8 (1983) ("Pre-
dictability in discipline requires that the employer always react in the same fash-
ion when presented with the same stimulus.").
58. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 682-84; J. REDEKER,
supra note 57, at 25.
59. SeeJ. REDEKER, supra note 57, at 30 (advocating employer's record-keep-
ing to facilitate comparison with discipline of prior offenses).
60. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 660-75.
61. See id. at 658-60 (violent or criminal nature of offense taken into
account).
62. See id. at 656-58.
63. See J. REDEKER, supra note 57, at 23-24.
64. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 661-63, 673-75 (arbi-
trators' burden of proof and due process considerations).
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facts of the case;65 10) attempts made to rehabilitate the em-
ployee by the employer; 66 11) progressive discipline steps that
may or may not have been taken;67 12) the discipline penalty
imposed as it relates to the facts of the case;68 13) whether a
"second chance" is warranted from the employee's prior record69
or 14) whether the employee is unreclaimable as indicated by
his/her prior record, facts of the case; etc.70 Thus, a relevant
question is whether the above factors are sufficient to establish
just cause by clear implication under Banas JJ.71
Where express just cause is not contained in a collective bar-
gaining agreement, many arbitrators imply a just-cause restric-
tion.72 For instance, arbitrator Walter E. Boles noted that "a 'just
cause' basis for consideration of disciplinary action is, absent a
clear proviso to the contrary, implied in a modern collective bar-
gaining agreement. ' 73 The reason is:
If the Company can discharge without cause, it can lay
65. See id. at 670 ("It is said to be 'axiomatic that the degree of penalty
should be in keeping with the seriousness of the offense.' ") (quoting Capital
Airlines, 25 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 13, 16 (1955) (Stowe, Ref.)).
66. See id. at 672-73 (rehabilitation through corrective or progressive disci-
pline); J. REDEKER, supra note 57, at 29 ("[C]entral to the arbitrator's reasoning
was the concept that the employer is obligated to make reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate an employee.").
67. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 670-73. For a discus-
sion of the traditional approach to progressive discipline, see J. REDEKER, supra
note 57, at 20-32.
68. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 664-67.
69. See id. at 678-81 (parameters of consideration given to employee's past
record).
70. For a general discussion of the above-listed factors, see F. ELKOURI &
E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54 andJ. REDEKER, supra note 57.
71. For example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that a manual containing an employee code of conduct and
specific grounds for termination, but without a specific provision governing the
length of the job tenure, was "insufficient to overcome the presumption that the
contract was freely terminable." Ruch v. Strawbridge & Clothier, Inc., 567 F.
Supp. 1078, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Furthermore, the Ruch court stated that
"[t]he provisions governing employee conduct in this action contain no assur-
ances that an employee will not be terminated even if the regulations contained
therein are rigidly adhered to by ... employees." Id. Whether this result is still
valid after Banas H is questionable.
At a minimum, such regulations of employee conduct may constitute just
cause by clear implication. The Banas H majority suggested that disciplinary
rules and grievance mechanisms might constitute some form of just cause, and
that Banas may have prevailed had a breach of these been alleged. See Banas II,
348 Pa. Super. at 484-85 & n.10, 502 A.2d at 647 & n.10.
72. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 652.
73. Id. (quoting Cameron Iron Works, 25 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 295, 301 (1955)
(Boles, Arb.)).
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off without cause. It can recall, transfer, or promote in
violation of the seniority provisions simply by invoking
its claimed right to discharge. Thus, to interpret the
Agreement in accord with the claim of the Company
would reduce to a nullity the fundamental provision of a
labor-management agreement-the security of a worker
in his job.74
It is not clear whether this can also be implied, pursuant to Banas
I, in handbooks and employment policies; i.e., whether the "fun-
damental" right to job security constitutes just cause by clear
implication.
Many collective bargaining agreements also contain progres-
sive discipline provisions. 75 These impose a form of procedural
due process through "an escalating series of disciplinary steps"
taken before termination of the employee. 76 Even in the absence
of progressive discipline provisions, collective bargaining agree-
ments "frequently enumerate 'cardinal sins' for which no prior
warning is necessary before an employer dismisses the em-
ployee." 77 The most common "cardinal sins" include dishonesty,
insubordination, drug use or alcohol consumption while on duty,
fighting, use of company vehicles without permission and posses-
sion of firearms on company property.78 Other misconduct of
equal magnitude will also justify termination for cause. 79
Termination is recognized as the ultimate industrial penalty
because the employee's job, contractual benefits and future em-
74. Id. (quoting Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 747, 749 (1949)
(Donnelly, Arb.)). Professor Perritt has suggested that arbitrators will imply a
just cause limitation "in order to avoid the danger of sustaining discipline at the
employer's whim." H. PERRI'rr, supra note 5, § 3.5, at 87.
75. See H. PERRITr, supra note 5, § 3.5, at 87.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 3.5, at 87-88. Employees who commit lesser offenses, or "sins,"
are subjected to progressive discipline. Id. § 3.5, at 88. For illustrative treat-
ment of various offenses, see F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 692-
707.
78. See H. PERRiTr, supra note 5, § 3.5, at 88. For analyses and representa-
tive cases of the most common "cardinal sins," see generallyJ. REDEKER, supra
note 57, at 55-251.
79. See Genuine Parts Co., 79 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 220, 224 (1982) (Reed,
Arb.) ("[T]here are certain offenses so serious that any employee in our indus-
trial society may properly be expected to know that such conduct is heavily pun-
ishable."); A. ZACK & R. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND
ARBITRATION 145 (1983) ("[T]hose acts that are immediately and substantially
destructive of the employment relationship ... will be grounds for immediate
discharge.").
[Vol. 32: p. 101
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ployability are at stake.80 In termination cases, the burden is
nearly always on the employer to prove employee wrongdoing,
and this is always so where the collective bargaining agreement
requires just cause for termination.8' However, the quantum of
proof required remains an unsettled issue.82
B. Just Cause Under Trainer v. Trainer Spinning Co.
Any discussion of just cause should not omit the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's decision in Trainer v. Trainer Spinning
Co. 8 3 Trainer involved the termination of an employee who had
been hired to manage a spinning company.8 4 The facts made no
reference to any written employment agreement.8 5 Only corpo-
rate minutes and resolutions referred to the employment.8 6 Ter-
mination occurred after "differences arose" between the
employee and some members of the corporation's board of direc-
tors.8 7 The employee sued to recover the balance of the salary
allegedly due for the remaining period of time that the employee
80. See H. PERRITr, supra note 5, § 3.5, at 88 (citing Stylemaster, Inc., 79
LAB. ARB. (BNA) 76, 77 (1982) (Winton, Arb)). Lesser penalties may include
warnings and suspensions.
81. See id.; accord, Stylemaster, Inc., 79 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 76, 77-78 (1982)
(Winton, Arb.) ("[I]t is a well-established principle in arbitration that the burden
to prove guilt or wrong-doing lies with management.").
82. See H. PERRITT, supra note 5, § 3.5, at 88. In a 1982 wrongful dismissal
case, arbitrator Jeffrey B. Winton stated:
While it is well-established that the burden of proof lies with manage-
ment, the quantum of proof is a less settled matter. In some cases,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required, yet in others a prepon-
derance of evidence or clear and convincing evidence is sufficient.
Sometimes, where proof is not strong enough to support discharge, it
is nonetheless sufficient to justify a lesser penalty.
Stylemaster, Inc., 79 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 76, 78 (1982) (Winton, Arb.); see also F.
ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 662-63 (several arbitrators' views on
proper quantum of required proof).
83. 224 Pa. 45, 73 A. 8 (1909). Although Trainer has never been expressly
overruled, it has also never been cited in a subsequent case. Its only reported
recognition, other than its original publication, appears in the American Law Re-
ports. See Annotation, Vacation Pay Rights of Employee Not Hired Under Collective La-
bor Agreement, 91 A.L.R. 2d 1078, 1079 n.4 (1963).
84. 224 Pa. at 50, 73 A. at 10. Trainer was hired in 1902 by the promoters
of a newly incorporated milling corporation to be a manager for a term of five
years at a salary of $2,500.00 per year. Id.
85. Id. at 46-52, 73 A. at 8-10.
86. Id. at 46-50, 73 A. at 8.
87. Id. at 51, 73 A. at 10. The Board initially resolved to give Trainer a
three-month "vacation" with pay while someone else managed the mill. Id. at
46, 73 A. at 8. When Trainer refused to take his leave and turn over the mill to a
new manager, the board reconvened and resolved to discharge him. Id. at 47,
73 A. at 8.
1987]
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was not permitted to continue as a manager.88
Although there was no evidence of any "just cause" policy or
provision in Trainer's alleged contract of employment, the trial
judge nonetheless instructed the jury to find for Trainer if they
concluded that he was hired "for five years or... for one year,
and that the discharge was made during the term without ajustifi-
able and a reasonable cause."89 The jury found for Trainer and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict stating that
"the jury could very properly . . . determine whether there was
'just cause' for the discharge." 90 The Trainer court held that ajust
cause review standard may be applicable under Pennsylvania law
where an employer breaches a contract of employment notwith-
standing the lack of an express "just cause" provision. An anal-
ogy can thus be drawn to a breach of handbook or employment
policy case such as Banas.9' It is suggested that the just-cause
standard in Trainer is equivalent to the "just cause by clear impli-
cation" standard that Banas II suggests. 92
C. Implications for the Pennsylvania Judiciary
Pennsylvania courts have not progressed in their resolution
of this question since the Third Circuit's original implications in
Novosel that handbooks of employment policies could be binding
commitments.93 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should now
review the recent Banas II decision,94 and enunciate a standard
which would prevent the need for employees and employers to
litigate what constitutes express just cause or just cause by clear
implication on a case-by-case basis. The court should set forth
conclusive guidance, as courts in other jurisdictions have done, as
to whether handbooks and employment policies are binding com-
mitments as part of a unilateral employment offer.95 Otherwise, it
88. Id. at 51, 73 A. at 9. Trainer was discharged after serving four years and
three months as manager. Id. at 51, 73 A. at 10.
89. Id. at 50, 73 A. at 9 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 51, 73 A. at 10; see also Decker, Forgotten Case May Be Key to At-Will
Law, VII PA. L.J. RrrR. 1 (No. 32, August 20, 1984).
91. See Decker, supra note 90.
92. See Banas H, 348 Pa. Super. at 484-85, 502 A.2d at 647 (if the handbook
had contained, if not expressly, at least by clear implication, a just cause provi-
sion, then appellee's claim might have merit) (emphasis in original).
93. For a discussion of Novosel, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying
text.
94. For a discussion of Banas H, see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying
text.
95. For a list ofjurisdictions which have decided whether an employer can
be bound to policies set out in a handbook or manual, see supra note 18.
[Vol. 32: p. 101
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will remain to be determined whether "just cause" with respect to
handbooks or employment policies may be viewed as it is by arbi-
trators interpreting collective bargaining agreements to consti-
tute express just cause or just cause by clear implication. 96 To
accomplish this, trial and lower appellate courts will expend much
time in exploring the meaning of express just cause and just cause
by clear implication.
D. Implications for Pennsylvania Employers Dealing with Handbooks
and Employment Policies After Banas
When an employer negotiates with a union the terms and
conditions for a collective bargaining agreement, it knows that it
is entering into an enforceable contract. Consequently, the em-
ployer gives careful consideration to the rights given to the un-
ionized employees and the rights retained by the company. In
dealing with nonunion employees, however, employers have tra-
ditionally enjoyed considerable unilateral discretion. Thus, state-
ments made in handbooks and employment policies were
intended to be general guidelines for conduct, but subject to
withdrawal, modification, exceptions or interpretation at any time
by the employer. Many employers have been surprised by the
present trend which suggests that handbooks and policy state-
ments are binding upon the employer and may imply other rights
in the employee as well. 97
Because of emerging legal requirements and the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court's door-opening decision in Banas II,
Pennsylvania employers may now wish to regard their handbooks
and employment policies in the same manner as collective bar-
gaining agreements, i.e., as binding and enforceable commit-
ments. 98  This may, in fact, provide a tangible benefit to
employers with nonunion workforces. Such employers may deter
or prevent employees from organizing by communicating to their
employees that they regard their handbook or policy statements
as binding commitments.99 Why do employees need a collective
96. For a discussion of just cause in the context of collective bargaining
agreements, see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
97. For a list of jurisdictions holding employee handbooks and manuals
binding upon the employer, see supra note 18.
98. See Reviewing the Employee Handbook, HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. (C.C.H.)
No. 61 (March 23, 1984).
99. Handbooks that contain some form of job protection counteract the
most important reason why employees seek to unionize. The value to an em-
ployee ofjob security and the power to contest employer termination decisions
in court should not be underestimated by employers. SeeJ. REDEKER, supra note
1987]
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bargaining agreement or union representative if they already
have enforceable employer commitments? This inquiry can be
particularly effective if the terms and conditions of the handbook
or employment policy equal or exceed that which employees
could gain from a collective bargaining agreement and a union
organizing campaign. As long as the provisions in the handbook
are perceived as fair by the employees, this argument could be
important in avoiding or deterring unionization.
California has dramatically circumscribed the at-will employ-
ment relationship; most jurisdictions have not gone as far.' 0 0
However, given the increasing sympathy of courts in responding
to these cases, employers may well be advised to "act as if" their
personnel decisions are potentially binding under the most re-
strictive standards. 1 1 Even if an employer is operating in a non-
union setting, every decision should be treated as if it were
subject to labor arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Therefore, an employer should anticipate having to meet a
just-cause standard for every adverse employee action it takes. In
this way, an employer may better defend its actions, as Banas II
suggests. 102
57, at 41 ("[E]mployee insecurity creates innumberable problems for the em-
ployer and, ultimately, produces union activity."); see also St. Antoine, supra note
4, at 35.
100. California courts have created exceptions to the at-will employment
relationship which extend beyond the increasingly recognized public policy and
statutory right exceptions. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d
167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (employee stated cause of action
for wrongful discharge where termination was based on unwillingness to partici-
pate in illegal price-fixing scheme); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (implied contract requiring employer not to act arbi-
trarily arose from employee's consistent promotions and employer's assur-
ances); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980) (termination without cause violates employer's implied promise of good
faith and fair dealing which arose from employee's eighteen years of service).
For a more complete discussion of exceptions to at-will employment in Califor-
nia, see C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, app. at 212.1-216.1 (Supp.
1985).
101. See H. PERRri-r, supra note 5, § 8.10 at 316 ("The basic question that
should be asked of top management ... is: Are you willing to have this particu-
lar provision legally enforced against you?").
102. For a discussion of Banas II, see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying
text.
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IV. CURTAILMENT OF FURTHER JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF THE
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
A. Darlington v. General Electric
Recently, in Darlington,l03 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
signaled the curtailment of further judicial erosion of at-will em-
ployment within Pennsylvania by announcing that "[i]nherent in
the at-will presumption itself is an important public policy-that
the employer should be master of his business."' 1 4 Darlington,
who had been employed as an engineer at General Electric for
fifteen years, was accused of certain expense and telephone ac-
count irregularities and was terminated. 10 5 Darlington brought a
wrongful discharge suit, claiming that his termination violated his
employment contract, which allegedly implied that employment
was to be for a reasonable length of time and could only be termi-
nated for just cause.' 0 6 At trial, the jury returned a $100,000 ver-
dict against General Electric.107 However, the trial court granted
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed.' 08 The Darlington court found the evi-
dence insufficient to overcome the at-will presumption, and
stated that the court therefore "cannot interfere with General
Electric's decision to discharge."' 10 9
103. 350 Pa. Super. 189, 504 A.2d 306 (1986).
104. Id. at 210-11, 504 A.2d at 320. The court reasoned that "[t]he policy
underlying the at-will presumption mandates that where there is no contract to
rebut the at-will presumption, and where no public policy has been violated by
the discharge, we must weigh the employer's interest in running his business
more heavily than all the other interests." Id.
105. Id. at 188, 504 A.2d at 308. Darlington claimed that "he did not know-
ingly and deliberately engage in the impermissible conduct he was charged with
but was merely following company policy as he knew it." Id.
106. Id. at 188, 504 A.2d at 308-09. Darlington contended that "the total-
ity of circumstances surrounding his hiring evinces the parties' intent that the
employment was to be for a reasonable length of time." Id. at 192, 504 A.2d at
311. These circumstances included the long-term nature of the projects on
which he was hired to work and the company policy, as explained to him, of
flexibility regarding employee "problems." Id. at 192, 504 A.2d at 310.
107. Id. at 187, 504 A.2d at 308.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 206, 504 A.2d at 317. The court noted: "Were we to open the
tribunals ofjustice and allow juries to decide every question involving an at-will
employee dismissal, we would be allowing them to dictate the business policies
of the giant corporation and the family run business alike." Id.; see also Martin v.
Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa. Super. 199, 220, 511 A.2d 830, 841 (1986)
("We believe ... that the employment should be presumed to be "at-will" un-
less an intent to alter the at-will relationship is clearly stated in the handbook.
The at-will rule will not be overcome by vague or general promises in Penn-
sylvania."). For a discussion of the holding in Martin, see supra note 51.
1987]
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Darlington has been the most employer-oriented decision to
date concerning Pennsylvania employment at-will doctrine. More
importantly, however, it represents judicial recognition of the
view that further modification of at-will employment should be
left to the legislature and not to the courts. The Darlington court
stated that "if terminable-at-will contracts are to be forbidden,
the judicial process may be an inappropriate forum for such
sweeping policy change."110
B. Legislative Regulation of At- Will Employment
May Be Drawing Nearer
Should the courts or the legislature be the primary movers in
modifying at-will employment? The Pennsylvania Superior
Court's decisions in Banas H and Darlington have brought this
question to the forefront in Pennsylvania."'
Modification of at-will employment is evolving in two set-
tings. First, the courts are taking action. Second, state legisla-
tures, along with Congress, may be compelled to provide a more
definite, logical and orderly framework for resolution of these
employment disputes. This action parallels employment law's de-
velopment prior to the enactment of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).I"2 Recent Pennsylvania judicial decisions verify that
110. Darlington, 350 Pa. Super. at 191-92, 504 A.2d at 310. The court
reasoned:
The citadel of the at-will presumption has been eroded of late, but it
has not been toppled. Perhaps the time has come for employees to be
given greater protection in this area. This was the opinion of one com-
mentator, who cautioned, however, that "Pennsylvania courts . ..
should at this time avoid further modification of the at-will employment
relationship. Restraint should be observed to minimize the adverse ef-
fects that any complete abrogation might have on employment, produc-
tive efficiency, and overburdening of the judicial process with
additional cases. Time and thought should be given now to whether
abrogation of the doctrine should occur through 'judicial erosion' or
'legislative mandate.' "
Id. (quoting Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania, supra note 4, at 479). The
court reasserted its position in a subsequent decision. See Martin v. Capital Cit-
ies Media, 354 Pa. Super. 199, 221, 511 A.2d 830, 841 (1986) ("The judicial
chamber is ill-equipped to determine what effects such a sweeping policy change
[of at-will employment] would have on society. Such a change would best be
accomplished by the legislative process, with its attendant public hearings and
debate."). For a discussion of the holding in Martin, see supra note 51.
111. For a discussion of Banas H, see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Darlington, see supra notes 103-10 and accompanying
text.
112. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Prior to the enactment
of the NLRA, "there developed a gradual sensitivity on the part of some courts
to the need for fair procedures in the issuance and enforcement of injunctions
124
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we are closer to legislative action than many realize or care to
admit." 3 The Pennsylvania Superior Court verified this in Dar-
lington, stating its disapproval of the courts as the setting for mod-
ification of at-will employment.114
It is no longer impossible to foresee what would be imposed
by the judiciary. Courts are likely to be long on generalization
and short on detail when outlining procedures, remedies, etc.
Even though, for understandable political reasons, the Penn-
sylvania legislature may not wish to take the initiative, it may be
compelled to take action on this issue by the boldness of some
courts in creating broad modifications and exceptions to the at-
will employment doctrine.
Courts are neither equipped to handle the additional
caseload of employee termination actions, nor sufficiently exper-
ienced in the area of employee terminations. Nonetheless, Penn-
sylvania state and federal courts are more frequently being called
upon to deal with these disputes.' 15 The judicial process is too
long and procedurally cumbersome to provide adequate or swift
remedies to the parties.116 Courts may be able to respond to the
extreme case and to the atypical situation of an employment ter-
and, more important, a legislative sensitivity toward the interests of the la-
borer." R. CORMAN, supra note 52, at 3. For an overview of the labor movement
leading to the NLRA, see generally id. at 1-6; C. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 1-66.
113. Evidence of the erosion of Pennsylvania employment at-will lies in the
Third Circuit's 1983 Novosel decision, which held that the binding effect of an
employer's practices or policies is a factual determination for the jury. See
Novosel, 721 F.2d at 902-03. Evidence also lies in the Pennsylvania Superior
Court's 1985 Banas H decision, which suggested that an employment manual
could bind an employer upon a showing of an express or implied just cause
provision. See Banas 11, 348 Pa. Super. at 485-86, 502 A.2d at 648. For a discus-
sion of Novosel, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Banas II, see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Darling-
ton, see supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
115. For example, federal courts in Pennsylvania have already dealt with a
sufficient number of cases to indicate that these disputes are not limited to the
state judiciary for resolution. See, e.g., Novosel, 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983);
Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Callahan v.
Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Wood v. Burlington Indus-
tries, 536 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Boresen v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526 F.
Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'dmem., 729 F.2d 1445 (3d Cir. 1984); Rogers v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Lekich v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1979); McNulty
v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Arnold v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 461 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1978); O'Neill v. A.R.A. Services,
457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052
(E.D. Pa. 1977); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
116. See H. PERRrI'r, supra note 5, § 9.11, at 348 ("Judicial recognition is
1987]
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mination. However, they have no capacity to construct an admin-
istrative mechanism for daily enforcement." 17
Congress and various state legislatures have prohibited, in
certain instances, the summary termination of an at-will em-
ployee. The primary federal statutory schemes that limit an em-
ployer's right to terminate an at-will employee are the NLRA t" 8
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." t 9 The NLRA pro-
hibits termination of employees for exercising the right to organ-
ize and select a representative. 120 Title VII prohibits any
termination based upon discrimination involving race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin. 12 1 In decisions enforcing these stat-
utes, courts have maintained that an employer may legally
terminate an employee for any reason except one specifically pro-
hibited by these statutes.' 22 Other federal legislation restricting
the right to terminate include: 1) the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967;123 2) the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970;124 3) the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assist-
ance Act of 1974;125 4) the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938126
available to employees without waiting for the legislatures to act .... On the
other hand, litigation is slow and expensive.").
117. See Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania, supra note 4, at 494.
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-69 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a discussion of em-
ployer discriminatory conduct in violation of the NLRA, see R. CORMAN, supra
note 52, at 132-44.
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1982).
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 158(a)(1) states: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this title."
Id. Section 157 employee rights include "the right to self-organization, [and] to
form, join, or assist labor organizations." Id. § 157.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982) ("it shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual ...because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....").
122. See, e.g., NLRB v. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 1942) ("If
the contract with the [union] was not in violation of the statute, it follows.., that
[the] discharges were proper.").
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual .. .because of such indi-
vidual's age.").
124. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982) ("No person shall discharge ... any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint ... under or related to
this chapter [Occupational Safety and Health Act].").
125. See 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1982) (guaranteeing right to reemployment
upon satisfactory completion of military service); id. § 2021 (b)(1) ("Any person
who is restored to or employed in a position in accordance with the provisions of
... subsection (a) ... shall not be discharged from such position without cause
within one year after such restoration or reemployment."); id. § 2021(b)(3)
126
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and 5) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.127 Various state statutes
contain similar limitations providing some protection for at-will
employees.' 2
At some point, employee groups and employers may support
legislation, preferring a statutory solution to "the broad strokes
and blurred outlines often produced by an innovative judici-
ary."1 29 Nonunionized employers may perceive legislation as the
most important deterrent to unionization of their workers, since it
minimizes the union's argument of increased job protection from
wrongful termination.13 0 The promise of a union bargaining for
greater job security cannot be underestimated, because job secur-
ity is one of the most important reasons employees seek to
organize.
Organized labor may be a critical factor in securing legisla-
tive relief.13 1 It might be the only interest group that would take
the lead in promoting such a cause. "A common assumption,
however, is that unions will not favor legislation protecting em-
ployees against arbitrary treatment by employers because it will
undercut one of the unions' prime selling points."'' 3 2 This possi-
(prohibiting denial of promotion or other employment advantage due to obliga-
tions as member of Armed Forces Reserve Component).
126. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person
to discharge ... any employee because such employee has filed any complaint
... under or related to this chapter [Fair Labor Standards Act].").
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) ("No otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
vidual.., shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .. ").
128. Several states have statutes barring discharges based upon political ac-
tivity. See, e.g., MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1975). Some states
prohibit discharges because of physical handicaps. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12,940(a) (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, Subd. 1(2)(b) (West
Supp. 1987). A few states statutorily prohibit employers from taking action
against employees for serving as jurors or for indicating their availability as ju-
rors, including Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota and Vermont.
Certain states prohibit termination for refusing to take a lie detector test, includ-
ing Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Washington. For a collection of relevant state
laws, see 1986 State Laws, LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 43,055. Another common pro-
vision in state laws proscribes retaliatory termination for filing a workers' com-
pensation claim. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp.
1986).
129. St. Antoine, supra note 4, at 35.
130. Id.
131. See H. PERRITr, supra note 5, § 9.4, at 335 ("The trade union move-
ment is well organized and influential with legislators .... [I]ts support would
be effective in behalf of ... wrongful discharge legislation.") (footnote omitted).
132. St. Antoine, supra note 4, at 35; see also H. PERRiTr, supra note 5, § 9.4,
at 335-36 ("The trade union movement has become increasingly aware ... that
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bility cannot be denied. However, organized labor could gain
considerably from refurbishing its image as the champion of the
disadvantaged.13 3 More practically, a universal rule requiring
cause for termination could actually benefit unions in their or-
ganizing drives by protecting union sympathizers. 134
C. Legislative Response in Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, several pieces of legislation have been intro-
duced since 1981 dealing with the summary termination of at-will
employees.' 35 Each of these legislative proposals has purported
to create a general statutory scheme to protect Pennsylvania's em-
ployees from wrongful terminations. 3 6 Excluded from coverage
are any employees protected by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, those protected by civil service, tenured employees or per-
sons who have a written employment contract of not less than two
years duration and whose contracts require not less than six
months notice of termination. 37 These bills would require em-
ployers to terminate employees only for "just cause."'13 8 If termi-
nated, the employee would have to receive oral notification at the
time of termination and written notification by registered mail
within fifteen calendar days of the termination, stating all reasons
for the action.' 3 9
This proposed legislation also permits an employee to file a
written complaint concerning his or her termination with the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation within thirty days of receipt of
written notice of the termination. 40 When the bureau receives
statutory expansion of employee rights may dilute the incentive for employees
to organize. It is well recognized that one of the benefits that union organizers
can offer to employee groups is protection against arbitrary dismissal.").
133. See St. Antoine, supra note 4, at 36.
134. See id.
135. See Pennsylvania House of Representatives, H.B. No. 1020 (April 23,
1985); Pennsylvania House of Representatives, H.B. No. 2105 (May 1, 1984);
Pennsylvania House of Representatives, H.B. No. 1742 (July 1, 1981).
136. See, e.g., Pennsylvania House of Representatives, H.B. No. 2105 (May
1, 1984) ("The purpose of this law is to further establish... employee rights and
to advance them to the point that all employees would have a process to seek
redress when they have been dismissed from employment for any reason other
than just cause.").
137. See, e.g., id. § 3 (definition of "employee").
138. See, e.g., id. § 4(a). The bills define a dismissal as "an involuntary dis-
charge from employment, including a resignation or voluntary quit resulting
from an improper or unreasonable action or inaction of the employer." See, e.g.,
id. § 3.
139. See, e.g., id. § 4(b).
140. See, e.g., id. § 5(a). Where the employer failed to provide written notifi-
[Vol. 32: p. 101
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss1/3
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
the complaint, it would then appoint a mediator to assist the em-
ployer and the terminated employee in resolving the dispute. 14'
If, after thirty calendar days from commencement of mediation,
no mutually satisfactory resolution occurred, the employee would
have the option of invoking arbitration proceedings. 142
After a hearing, the arbitrator could select remedies that in-
clude: 1) sustaining the termination; 2) reinstating the employee
with no, partial or full back pay and 3) ordering a severance pay-
ment.1 43 The arbitrator's decision would be final and binding
upon the parties, and reviewable in the court of common pleas for
the county where the dispute arose or where the employee re-
sides. 144 However, if a party sought judicial review, the court
could set aside the award only if the arbitrator "was without, or
exceeded the scope of, his jurisdiction, or that the award was pro-
cured by fraud, collusion or other similar and unlawful
means."
145
It is likely that the legislature will not enact these proposals
in their present form, if at all. However, the bills provide an ex-
cellent reference point for all interested parties to begin the de-
bate on abrogating at-will employment through legislative action.
As employees become increasingly concerned over the impor-
tance and security of their jobs, they will demand in greater num-
bers that the legislature take action to preserve their jobs,
especially in times of inflation or high unemployment.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislation may provide a statutory scheme which could re-
sult in quick, inexpensive and binding resolution of wrongful ter-
mination disputes, similar to that of the arbitration procedures
contained in many collective bargaining agreements. 146 Today it
is more imperative than ever for a realistic examination of this
cation of the termination, the employee may file a complaint within 45 days of
the discharge. See, e.g., id. § 5(b).
141. See, e.g., id. § 6(a).
142. See, e.g., id. § 6(b), 7(a). The employee may, alternatively, request a
continuance of the mediation if he "believes that a mutual resolution of the dis-
pute is possible." Id. § 7(a).
143. See, e.g., id. § 8(b).
144. See, e.g., id. § 9.
145. Id. § 11.
146. For an excellent review of statutory proposals for regulating wrongful
terminations, see H. PERRiIT, supra note 5, ch. 9; see also F. ELKOURI & E.A.
ELKOURI, supra note 54, at 7-9 (discussing advantages of arbitration over
litigation).
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area. The surge of at-will employment litigation has not dimin-
ished, and attorneys continue to develop novel theories with
which to impose liability on employers for wrongful
terminations. 147
Legislative regulation, then, is all the more needed today. It
is submitted that instead of opposing legislation, the prudent em-
ployer should welcome a statutory scheme as providing an or-
derly legal remedy outside the courtroom. Such legislation
lessens the prospect of costly litigation in light of the fact that
terminated employees can, under the present law, be expected to
litigate new fact situations concerning an employer's obligation to
deal with employees fairly and in good faith.'14 One cannot over-
emphasize the cost of traditional litigation to employers. Proce-
dures such as motions to dismiss, depositions, interrogatories,
and lengthy discovery proceedings are ill-suited to the area of em-
ployee terminations. The cost and delay of arriving at a final re-
sult are unacceptable. Employers and employees can both benefit
from a relatively quick, inexpensive and binding mechanism for
dealing with disputes over alleged wrongful terminations.
Arbitration, although not a perfect solution, presents one
method for addressing these issues. Had employers covered by
collective bargaining agreements been forced to follow the tradi-
tional litigation route to resolving employee terminations, they
would have suffered serious financial crises years ago. Instead,
arbitration has served as an alternative mechanism to contest an
employee termination arising under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Despite its imperfections, arbitration, when contrasted
with traditional litigation, still provides a binding resolution more
quickly and more inexpensively. 149
In Darlington, a Pennsylvania appellate court has indicated for
the first time that a legislative scheme might realistically offer the
best solution to confront the rapidly developing area of the law of
at-will employment. 50 Darlington suggested that until legislation
regulating employment terminations is considered, courts should
147. See, e.g., Wainauskis v. Howard Johnson Co., 339 Pa. Super. 266, 488
A.2d 117 (1985) (malicious prosecution).
148. For a discussion of the benefits of legislation to employers, see
Decker, at-will employment in Pennsylvania, supra note 4, at 496.
149. See Decker, Federal Regulation, supra note 4, at 362 ("Arbitration would
provide a proven, quick, inexpensive, and final resolution without overburden-
ing the courts.") (citing Mennemier, Protection from Unjust Discharge: An Arbitration
Scheme, 19 HARV. J. LEGIS. 49, 74 (1982).
150. For a discussion of Darlington, see supra notes 103-10 and accompany-
ing text.
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refrain from developing a common law that encourages further
overburdening the state and federal judicial system with these dis-
putes. 15 1 The Banas H decision confirmed this, in that it resulted
in the need for additional litigation to determine what constitutes
"just cause" or "just cause by clear implication," for the purpose
of rendering handbook and employment policies binding upon an
employer. 52 Perhaps the time has come to begin a thoughtful
dialogue which will realistically address this area of employment
law through a statutory solution.1 53
151. Darlington, 350 Pa. Super. at 191, 504 A.2d at 310.
152. See Banas II, 348 Pa. Super. at 481-86, 502 A.2d at 646-48. For a dis-
cussion of Banas H, see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
153. For suggested drafts of model state statutes governing wrongful dis-
missal, see H. PERRITr, supra note 5, at 407-14; Decker Proposal, supra note 4, at
202-09.
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